01:07:32HM_:Bitcore is a complete, native interface to the Bitcoin network
01:07:34HM_:Since when is javascript native? :S
01:15:16lnovy:native as not offloading the heavy liftingb to some other library
01:17:52HM_:yes, or daemon in this case
01:20:51sipa:or a website
01:22:40HM_:which likely just calls the daemon
01:22:55sipa:which just calls other daemons :p
01:24:37lnovy:butcore seems to have this daemon implemented in native node.js :)
01:27:00Emcy:wut is bitcore
01:27:56lnovy:library for doing stuff with bitcoin network, wallet files, transactions ect...
01:28:22Emcy:fuck sake
01:28:46Emcy:bitcoin just renames to bitcoin core
01:29:01Emcy:like the nomeclature is not confused enough
01:29:58HM_:well you should have been more original :P
01:32:29Emcy:if anything has most claim to be named bitcoins core its the satoshi code
01:33:28HM_:if it helps any, i think bitcore is a sucky name
01:33:47HM_:with a hipster tld... pfft .io, come on
01:34:18Emcy:yeah thats pretty hipster
02:36:00maaku:error correcting decoder finished : https://gist.github.com/maaku/8996338
02:46:02andytoshi:i've proven that an ecdsa malleating fn has to depend on key, there are no key-independent general malleations except the s → -s one that we know of.
02:46:21andytoshi:obvs this is not enough since the attacker can see the pubkey and use this in his malleation scheme. but maybe it's a start
02:47:29andytoshi:nice maaku!
02:47:55maaku:so translation: without pubkey malleation is impossible (except s -> -s), but with pubkey still needs research?
02:48:41maaku:is that accurate?
02:49:25Luke-Jr:reminder: you can infer the pubkey from the signature
02:49:29andytoshi:and actually the dependence is on privkey, but it's really hard to say with ecdsa that the attacker has no knowledge of the privkey..
02:49:35andytoshi:Luke-Jr: yup, i'm aware :)
02:54:18andytoshi:wait, there's a bug in my argument, i've eliminated far fewer attacks than i thought..
02:54:44andytoshi:maaku can have the spotlight back
03:20:04andytoshi:nope, i was right. if i can push from this required key-dependence to actually obtaining the privkey (or some non-negligible info about it) i'll have reduced malleating to an actual ecdsa attack
03:25:08gmaxwell:andytoshi: don't forget that the attacker may have multiple signatures (assume he has a signing oracle)
03:31:47andytoshi:gmaxwell: yep. if this works with one input sig, it works with an arbitrary number of them.
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