| 02:50:43 | gmaxwell_: | gmaxwell_ is now known as Guest35033 |
| 02:53:16 | Pan0ram1x: | Pan0ram1x is now known as Guest45377 |
| 02:54:04 | Aesthetic: | Aesthetic is now known as Logicwax |
| 02:54:04 | [\\\\]: | [\\\\] is now known as [\\\] |
| 02:54:18 | _2539_: | _2539_ is now known as _2539 |
| 02:54:40 | warren_2: | warren_2 is now known as warren |
| 02:54:55 | CryptOprah_: | CryptOprah_ is now known as CryptOprah |
| 02:55:03 | coryfields_: | coryfields_ is now known as cfields |
| 02:56:02 | cfields: | cfields is now known as coryfields_ |
| 02:59:29 | luke-jr_: | luke-jr_ is now known as Luke-Jr |
| 03:32:05 | Guest35033: | Guest35033 is now known as gmaxwell |
| 05:03:45 | woah: | so what about these storage mining coins? |
| 05:55:23 | gmaxwell: | woah: I'm not aware of any which are technically interesting currently. At least the initial proposals thave I've seen have mostly been technobabble AFAICT. |
| 05:56:08 | gmaxwell: | Amiller's permacoin paper explores some interesting ideas, but all these altcoin things seem to eschew rigorous thought (and the compromises in deliverables that come with) entirely. |
| 06:01:33 | woah: | you think that maidsafe, filecoin, etc are not going to work? |
| 06:16:20 | phantomcircuit: | woah, they're vaguely neat |
| 06:16:30 | phantomcircuit: | but i would be surprised if they actually work |
| 06:16:38 | woah: | yea will be cool to find out |
| 06:23:35 | gmaxwell: | woah: haven't looked lately. Everything that I've seen has been serious red flags. |
| 06:23:52 | gmaxwell: | As in, text that clearly indicates the speaker either doesn't understand the issue or doesn't care. |
| 06:24:02 | woah: | whats a good example? |
| 06:25:14 | phantomcircuit: | woah, it's hard to point to something because it all changes every few weeks (or faster) |
| 06:25:30 | phantomcircuit: | which is likely itself a strategy to avoid criticism |
| 06:25:31 | phantomcircuit: | :/ |
| 06:26:48 | woah: | sorry to hear that |
| 06:27:13 | woah: | resistant to whitepaper analysis attack |
| 06:35:00 | fluffypony: | woah: they use PoW...Proof of Whitepaper |
| 06:35:47 | woah: | yea... i wonder if it would be more effective for peopl designing these things to write simple simulations instead |
| 06:36:39 | woah: | somewhere between pseudocode in a whitepaper and an actual implementation |
| 06:36:56 | fluffypony: | yeah |
| 06:37:20 | woah: | was attempting to do that with a currency my friend was designing |
| 06:37:32 | woah: | found that his whitepaper was incomplete in the process! |
| 07:33:02 | sipa_: | sipa_ is now known as sipa |
| 07:42:49 | cbeams_: | cbeams_ is now known as cbeams |
| 07:45:41 | SDC: | SDC is now known as SDCDev |
| 08:05:13 | cameron.freenode.net: | topic is: This channel is not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja |
| 08:05:13 | cameron.freenode.net: | Users on #bitcoin-wizards: andy-logbot jtimon austinhill melvster AlSzacrel cbeams c0rw1n justanotheruser AaronvanW RoboTeddy vmatekole emsid Iriez jgarzik [Derek] comboy burcin todaystomorrow gsdgdfs nsh rdponticelli TheSeven NikolaiToryzin Anduck HM Krellan arowser DoctorBTC warren Guest45377 Logicwax coinheavy coryfields_ [\\\] pigeons_ xenogis Luke-Jr sipa gmaxwell CryptOprah Meeh_ Taek kanzure_ SDCDev iddo_ _2539 LaptopZZ_ lnovyz Grishnakh d4de^^ devrandom dgenr8 |
| 08:05:13 | cameron.freenode.net: | Users on #bitcoin-wizards: Dr-G2 roconnor tacotime moa Adlai hguux Aquent Starduster drawingthesun artilectinc zwischenzug spinza derzp Alanius rfreeman_w K1773R grandmaster2 Sangheili tromp_ phantomcircuit mortale wizkid057 kumavis heath lianj Graftec wiretapped @ChanServ phedny lechuga_ abc56889 throughnothing harrow asoltys forrestv SomeoneWeird fluffypony mr_burdell Apocalyptic kinlo midnightmagic starsoccer so ahmed_ Gnosis Keefe pajarillo roasbeef mmozeiko ryan-c |
| 08:05:13 | cameron.freenode.net: | Users on #bitcoin-wizards: otoburb helo [Tristan] TD-Linux catcow danneu UukGoblin poggy_ coryfields kgk btc_ crescendo amiller Eliel optimator zibbo_ jbenet mappum MRL-Relay Dyaheon livegnik hollandais yoleaux [d__d] berndj firepacket shesek jrayhawk_ nuke1989 Hunger-- Muis jaekwon Emcy Kretchfoop EasyAt nanotube gribble weex bbrittain tromp michagogo artifexd Fistful_of_coins dansmith_btc copumpkin sl01 @gwillen samson_ go1111111 LarsLarsen HaltingState Graet altoz |
| 08:05:13 | cameron.freenode.net: | Users on #bitcoin-wizards: BlueMatt smooth epscy CodeShark digitalmagus Max_H3adr00m kaene ebfull myeagleflies BrainOverfl0w espes__ wumpus fanquake irc88 pi07r waxwing BigBitz petertodd bobke andytoshi a5m0 |
| 09:31:15 | Meeh_: | Meeh_ is now known as Meeh |
| 11:01:53 | adam3us: | nsh: i think u get that for free when using addresses, because the addr = H(pubkey), and the signature reveals the pubkey. the pubkey is a point. i used that fact in committed tx to delay revealing information until spent. you can also check double-spend using that, which might be relevant for this app, you can find the thread on bitcointalk |
| 12:24:22 | Taek: | woah, I've spent a good amount of time reading the storage whitepapers. Filecoin has a few problems, one of which means that larger mining operations will get quadratically increasing returns on their investments |
| 12:24:57 | Taek: | maidsafe is enormously complex, the attack surface is huge and last time I checked, each file was only stored on 4 machines |
| 12:26:20 | Taek: | Storj's whitepaper is vague at best, they don't go into the specifics of how things are done which means you can't analyze it for security |
| 12:54:43 | pigeons_: | pigeons_ is now known as pigeons |
| 12:58:23 | mist: | [Global Notice] Hi all, I know a fair few of you have requested an update on the recent server compromise. For those interested in a brief update you can head over to http://bit.ly/1z78rgQ to read a few words penned by the very generous NCC Group, who have been invaluable in helping us investigate the issue. Thank you! |
| 13:03:18 | mist: | [Global Notice] Clearly the previously mentioned URL is not equipped to handle thousands of freenoders hitting it at once. If you're interested, try again later. |
| 14:01:45 | Eliel: | Taek: so, storj whitepaper assumes certain tools and describes how to use them to build the system but the tools aren't defined? |
| 14:03:07 | Taek: | The tools are defined (partially) but I don't think they say how the tools will be incorporated into a blockchain |
| 14:18:26 | tacotime: | Taek: super3 is here if you want to talk to him about storj |
| 14:27:10 | pigeons: | i've asked about that too, super3 says the whitepaper is being udated/improved |
| 15:30:07 | kanzure_: | kanzure_ is now known as kanzure |
| 15:35:52 | Emcy: | "In technical terms, when a system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt uses PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1,000 iterations. For standard containers and other (i.e. non system) partitions, TrueCrypt uses at most 2,000 iterations." |
| 15:36:00 | Emcy: | does that sound like a genuine weakness |
| 15:37:17 | Emcy: | this guys forked TV znd beefed up the iterations to 500,000 or so and says that makes it a lot better |
| 15:37:25 | Taek: | Sounds fine to me, you just need a stronger password |
| 15:38:19 | Taek: | 500,000 iterations means an attacker needs to do the hash operation 500 times as much, which is only about 10 bits of entropy. Adding a single dictionary word to the end of your would-be password adds the same amount of security |
| 15:38:49 | Emcy: | right, i thought it sounded like a bit of spin |
| 15:40:08 | Emcy: | but considering most people use shitty passwords, upping greatly the iterations would likely be useful right |
| 15:42:38 | Taek: | yes. Especially if you can do 500k iterations in under 1 second, there's not much disadvantage. |
| 15:43:05 | Emcy: | ok |
| 15:43:13 | Emcy: | well thats atleats 2 forks of TC i know about now |
| 15:43:48 | Emcy: | gonna take a good while before consensus skaes out on who is the true heir |
| 16:37:23 | tacotime: | well, for truecrypt probably using a better key derivation technique would also be pretty useful, eg scrypt with 2GB or so. i don't know if any of the forks do. |
| 16:37:49 | tacotime: | But you could always do that manually. |
| 17:47:31 | davidlatapie: | davidlatapie has left #bitcoin-wizards |
| 19:31:56 | tacotime: | In Bitcoin, most OP codes for scripts are disabled because they are unsafe. Is there a writeup somewhere detailing a security analysis as to why each of these OP codes are disabled and what hazards they may pose? |
| 19:33:00 | sipa: | paranoia |
| 19:33:04 | samson2: | samson2 is now known as samson_ |
| 19:33:19 | sipa: | also, it doesn't matter anymore; for all intents and purposes, these opcodes don't exist |
| 19:34:45 | tacotime: | Right. ByteCoin proposed a simplified scripting system using on the operators min, max, sum, mul, and cmp, however, they failed to implement it at release. |
| 19:35:19 | tacotime: | I get the feeling that these operators generally are not safe, but I don't have proof, and I'm not sure where to go to look for examples of where they would be unsafe. |
| 19:35:56 | tacotime: | min, max, cmp, and sum probably, but mul I'm wary of. |
| 19:36:21 | sipa: | the unsafe thing in bitcoin was op_cat mostly, as it allowed for exponential mmeory usage |
| 19:36:27 | tacotime: | Ah. |
| 20:09:45 | petertodd: | sipa: it's really unfortunate that OP_CAT wasn't simply fixed by having it check the output against the max pushdata limit |
| 20:11:08 | Aquent_: | Aquent_ is now known as Aquent |
| 22:37:14 | gmaxwell: | I think I'd checked before and actually all all the disabled ones I was able to figure out at least on way they were unsafe.. I think .. except one. |
| 22:38:12 | sipa: | actually all all? |
| 22:43:46 | gmaxwell: | ooops. Was fretting there if it was all or all but one, can't remember which one. |
| 23:21:13 | poggy_: | poggy_ is now known as poggy |